The Tractatus begins with Wittgenstein’s ontology: facts, totalities of facts, states of affairs, objects, combinations of objects, etc. By contrast, the Investigations does not begin in that way: it begins with language—and it goes on in the same way. No reader could hazard a guess as to Wittgenstein’s ontology in the Investigations. Certainly, no consequences for meaning are derived from a presumed ontology. Nor can we derive anything ontological from his later account of meaning as use, rule following, practice, custom, etc. His remarks on meaning are ontology-neutral. He could be an idealist or a materialist or a neutral monist so far as his view of meaning is concerned. Indeed, as far as I can see he could hold fundamentally the same ontological views at the time of the Investigations as he held at the time of the Tractatus. But he never gives us any clue either way. It is as if he has lost interest in reality and is concerned only with language. There is no linguistic turn in the Tractatus—he enunciates his ontology (metaphysics) without reference to language but simply from a priori first principles about how things have to be. Nor does he attempt any such derivation in the Investigations: he doesn’t (a la Dummett) attempt to derive an ontology from reflections on language. He simply turns to language and stays turned that way. He gives up metaphysics. This should be commented on more (I have never seen it so much as mentioned by commentators). (I myself said nothing about it in Wittgenstein on Meaning.) Wouldn’t it be strange if he still held the same ontological views at the time of the Investigations? Did he ever substitute new views? He does say in section 46: “Both Russell’s ‘individuals’ and my ‘objects’ (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements [referring to the Theaetetus]”. He then goes on to argue that we can’t speak of things being “simple” or “composite” in any absolute sense but only within a particular language game. But this doesn’t rule out other aspects of his Tractatus ontology, specifically the idea of reality as a totality of facts. Does he still accept the existence of facts? Is he still a logical atomist? Does he still think some things can only be shown? The Investigations is ontology-free compared to the Tractatus, but there is no attempt to explain why this should be.