Mass and Consciousness
Mass and Consciousness
In “The Mysteries of Mass” Jorge Cham and Daniel Whitestone write as follows: “We have many descriptions of mass but very little understanding of what it is and why we have it. We all feel mass. As a baby, you develop that sense that some things are harder to push around than others. But as familiar as that feeling is, most physicists would struggle to explain the underlying technical details. As you’ll see in this chapter, most of your mass is not made out of the masses of all the particles inside of you. We don’t know even know why some things have mass and some don’t, or why inertia perfectly balances out the force of gravity. Mass is mysterious, and you can’t it all on that dessert you had last night.” (58-60)[1] Here we can substitute “consciousness” for “mass” in certain places and get something both sensible and true. In particular, consciousness is a mystery, and despite the fact that we all feel it we don’t know why some things have it and some don’t. The authors go on to observe that inertia is a mystery and that we don’t understand why some things have it and some don’t (64, 68). They also note that particles have very different masses for which we have no explanation: it seems arbitrary what mass a particular type of particle has. Particle mass is not predictable from such properties as charge or spin; it seems like a brute fact of nature. The authors sum up: “It’s amazing to think that something so fundamental to our existence [mass] can still be a mystery” (74)
The analogies to consciousness are staring us in the face, though our authors make no allusion to them. Specifically: (a) we don’t know why some things are conscious and some are not, and (b) the reason why some neurons are associated with consciousness and some are not is opaque to us (not predictable from their physical-chemical properties). The mysteries thus take an analogous form in both cases. Our familiarity with both things may blind us to their mysteries, but a little probing reveals a deep lack of comprehension. I would put the point this way: some things have mass/inertia and some don’t (space, time, neutrinos, numbers, maybe thoughts), just as some things are conscious and some are not (particles, rocks, numbers, space and time). We don’t understand why this is—we just know that it is. Nor do we know why these things are mysterious (the mystery is a mystery). Nor do we see any method by which we could resolve the mystery. The mysteries are deep, intractable. Did mass evolve from an earlier massless state of the universe? If so, evolved from what and by what mechanism or process? Did consciousness evolve from an earlier non-conscious state of the universe? If so, evolved from what and by what mechanism or process? We might compare the massless neutrino with the insentient zombie: both behave like objects with mass/consciousness, yet these attributes are lacking. In short, the parallels are remarkable and instructive.
Here are two further points of analogy, both quite speculative. First, mass is defined in terms of inertia, i.e., resistance to change of motion in response to force applied; while consciousness is often defined in terms of what might be called epistemic resistance, i.e., ease of knowledge by an outside party (the other minds problem in its various forms). Mass is defined by how easy it is to move the object; mind is defined by how easy it is to know the object (subject). Some objects are harder to move than others, and some minds are harder to know than others (by other minds). Second, there are two concepts of mass in physics, inertial mass and gravitational mass, which though distinct are closely related. Similarly, in psychology there are two types of consciousness, non-conceptual consciousness and conceptual consciousness. Though distinct, these are closely related. Perceptual consciousness is inherently non-conceptual; cognitive consciousness is essentially conceptual or propositional. Sensation and thought are two types of consciousness, as inertial mass and gravitational mass are two types of mass. So, there is a similar abstract structure here. Of course, none of these analogies and mysteries provide reasons to jettison mass or consciousness from our conceptual scheme; but they do encourage tolerance of the mysteries attending consciousness. Even so basic a scientific concept as mass has its mysterious side.[2]
[1] We Have No Idea (2017), chapter 5.
[2] Of course, consciousness isn’t identical to mass!
A few thoughts on the “we have no idea” end of this. Mass is just one form of energy. The only form we know much about, such as its constituents. Energy and mass are directed by fields (gravitational, electromagnetic) whose make up is no clearer than consciousness. The particles that make up mass are formed by quantum fields which permeate the universe. Lastly, all this is 5% of the known universe, with dark matter and dark energy making up the rest. We only know these indirectly by their effects on galaxy-wide matter. We are shivering hominids in a cave, certain there is nothing beyond the mountain and afraid the next rumble of thunder is surely our last.
It’s odd that Plato had no idea that humans once lived in caves, despite his cave analogy.
It’s also weird that Plato’s cave and shadows analogy is similar to string theory in that it assumes there are more dimensions than we can detect.
True, the perceived world is really a platonic cave if a multi-dimensional view of reality is correct. Question: how many dimensions does the world of universals have–none or infinitely many?
Hegelian Luddite over here, in the end we all know it’s either going to end up being 69 or 420.
I don’t follow you.
In the early aughts, S. Hawking admitted to his protégé Carsten van de Bruck that metaphysics was a missing component to understanding; “we need to imagine.” Indeed, religiopolitics cleaved isolated science from metaphysics in the 16th century. As evidence of inaccurate findings become apparent, it becomes ever more imperative that imagination and wonder play a role.
E.g.: Tufts U. developmental biologist, Michael Levine recently discovered how single-cell slime molds make critical decisions with no brain. Astro physicists are finally beginning to link the unmistakable quantum math between particle and astro determinants.
Plato comprehended nature, as did Kant, Spinoza, and so many theorists. I believe that it is time to work on reuniting the damage caused by religiopolitics so many years ago.
I do think physics and metaphysics should not be kept as rigidly separate as they have been since the days of positivism.
“Mass is just one form of energy.” …and energy in turn is “the ability to do work.” Swell! That clears that up.
I have a feeling Plato had an inkling or prejudiced suspicion that barbarous humans may have lived in caves in ages past (but surely even in his own day), much like barbarous cyclops were clearly described as doing so by Homer. On the matter of consciousness itself, I’m reminded of Derrida’s apparently literal belief or at least superstition that thoughts physically impregnated letters, postcards, snail mail, etc: that these thoughts were a sort of actually existing ghostly remnant that haunted and overlay the grammatico-scriptural semantic message itself (at least at times).
If he did have such an inkling, it was not based on solid empirical evidence; and of course the parable of the cave doesn’t rely on it. Oh, Derrida!
Would one not expect to find a number of parallels between two unknowns once one starts comparing them for specifics which are unknown?
It depends on the cases: one wouldn’t expect much analogy between unknown numbers and unknown planets. In the case of mass and consciousness the mystery centers on contingency (the different masses associated with otherwise similar particles and the different types of consciousness associated with otherwise similar neurons).
About the numbers and planets, would that not depend on how one frames the specifics? On the numbers and planets there are parallels such as that “they might be few or many”. Somehow it seems to me unsatisfactory to look for parallels between unknowns. Typically we compare knowns for similarities and differences.
Mysteries are not typically about “unknowns”: the entity is known but some aspect of it is not understood (known). We know what mass and consciousness are but certain facts about them are mysterious. We know that different particles have different masses, and that different neurons are correlated with different qualia, but we don’t know why.
Could you explicate what you have in mind when you say that “we know that different neurons are correlated with different qualia”?
I mean that different neurons of the same general type are associated with radically different qualia, as with visual and auditory qualia. How can these differences of phenomenology be generated by the same physical neural type?
Somehow the ‘reply’ button is missing from your response to my query about “neurons correlated with different qualia”, so I use the closest available ‘reply’ instead.
You ask “How can these differences of phenomenology be generated by the same physical neural type?” For one thing, there are many physical differences between neurons in the visual system and those in the auditory system, in molecular markers, etc. But even assuming they were identical down to the last atom in their composition, there is a crucial difference between them which is inherent to the organization of the brain they serve as functional elements: they occupy DIFFERENT PLACES in its connectivity, that is, in its global organization, so why should mystery encumber their association with different qualia?
The trouble is that phenomenological heterogeneity far exceeds neural heterogeneity. Also, the association between the two looks completely arbitrary. This is all covered in the literature under “intuitions of contingency” and the “explanatory gap”.
You exemplified “radically different qualia” with visual and auditory qualia, and asked how that radical difference could be generated “by the same physical neural type”. I gave you “the same physical neural type” for the sake of argument, and pointed to the radically different disposition of the visual and auditory subsets of neurons with regard to the brain’s connectivity as a whole as the answer. One radical difference explained by another radical difference, no?
Not really: you are appealing to functional differences to explain qualia differences, but these have the same problems as intrinsic neural differences, viz. intuitions of contingency (Kripke) and explanatory gaps (Nagel, Levine, Jackson et al). Here we need to note the difference from cases of genuine reductive explanation as is “water is H2O” and “heat is molecular motion”. Absent qualia, inverted qualia, zombies, multiple realization, etc. Block, Chalmers, Searle, me, et al.
You might want to have a look at my “A Triple Aspect Theory” on this blog, which represents a more nuanced view of the issue than is typical.
Functional difference? No, no, that difference is physical, it is anatomical, it is constituted by a fundamental difference in physical connectivity which, because that fundamental difference ramifies into every other difference that can be made in neural terms, amounts to more than what might follow from a difference in what you, in your July 9 reply, called “neural type”. You clearly implied that a difference in “neural type” might explain differences in qualia, and that is what I am following up on. I have now given you a difference between the visual and auditory subsets of all neurons just as fundamental as a difference in “neural type” — if not more — and am offering it, in the same spirit as your July 9 reply, for consideration as a possible account of the difference in qualia.
If by “organization” we mean a physical (i.e. neural) fact, then we have just specified the same general type of brain process for visual and auditory experience; but this won’t explain the deep phenomenological difference between these experiences. What makes the different neural correlates correspond to the visual/auditory distinction and not just a distinction within a single sensory mode? We can’t infer these phenomenological types from the physical information alone. At bottom we just have contingently connected correlates not reductions to physical processes, i.e. we can’t identify the experience type with a physical type. I am just repeating what has been extensively argued by others.
No, not a fact, but a difference, and a difference at least as basic as the one which you yourself in your July 9 reply implied might account for the difference between visual and auditory qualia. Unless you address what I say in my July 15 and 17 replies, and specifically the parallelism between your July 9 argument and what I sketch in my three statements of the 15th and 17th, perhaps after re-reading them and your own July 9th statement, I see little point in continuing this exchange.
Nor do I, but I think you must have misunderstood my initial statement: I never said or implied that neural differences could account for phenomenal differences, and I most certainly reject that claim. But I can see how a reductive materialist might be tempted by such a move.
What happens if you replace the word “consciousness” in your analogy with “life”, especially from the perspective of, say, a vitalist from the 19th century? Seems to fit perfectly.
“The analogies to [life] are staring us in the face, though our authors make no allusion to them. Specifically: (a) we don’t know why some things are [alive] and some are not, and (b) the reason why some [molecules/cells/whatever] are associated with [life] and some are not is opaque to us (not predictable from their physical-chemical properties).” etc etc.
This issue of what “life” is was solved gradually and over time. What once seemed like a mystery gradually dissolved. Why should consciousness be any different?
To me consciousness, like life, seems complicated and complex, but not fundamentally mysterious.
The analogy is very thought provoking, glad I stumbled on this.
Life was indeed a mystery back then, so the substitution works nicely. You raise the question of how mysterious consciousness is, which I don’t address here. I can only suggest you read my published work on this (and other mysterians like Chomsky).
Appreciate your response. I’ll have to read more of your work. I listened to an audio series you did on philosophy probably 20 years ago when I was just getting into the subject which I still remember fondly. I wrote a few thoughts in response to the analogy if you’re interested. I’ll have to elaborate my own ideas further as well. Thanks again. All the Best.
https://substack.com/inbox/post/133817391
Cracking consciousnesss! Easier done then said. Only the ‘enertia’ wiithin the mind, that is the collection of prejudice and bias, both religious and secular, like invisible bars, imprison and blind the mind from imagining and testing for a greater reality.
http://www.energon.org.uk
Not sure what to make of this, but always up for a bold move (as against mental inertia).
This is enticing! The analogy between mass and consciousness begs the question, how did we get difference into our universe?
Our standard thought is that development and evolution is a function of time — cumulative change over time leads to growth etc. But if one goes back to the origin one is confronted with the problem of how elemental reality can contain difference at all, since once is stuck with the paradox of determining when if appeared for the first time. The nice thing about bringing mass into the conversation is that unlike life which we ascribe to evolution it is much harder to do the same with virtually timeless entities of mass, and there is no way to ascribe evolution or historical time to mass itself.
The fact remains that the universe is comprised of entities that are similar and dissimilar to one another — which makes difference the bedrock of existence — what’s more it is clear that this difference is not a simple product of chance, and that difference is actually reproduced and reformed. For example, the circle, square, and triangle… they do not require time to develop. There is no embryonic triangle. It is as though we live in a universe that exists before time — as far out as it seems, the world of forms seems to exist prior to time or outside it. And while time is needed to create individuals, it is not necessary to the existence of form itself.
The million dollar question is, what is form?
You use “beg the question” to mean “raise the question” (a common mistake); it means “give an argument that presupposes what you set out to justify”.
Sorry , i’m an artist not a philosopher. I guess my point was that i found your post inspirational!
Now you can correct people who make the same mistake! I’m glad you found it inspirational.
Fodor was always one for accusing his critics of, “begging the questions”, which he posed or addressed. Not necessarily a disingenuous rhetorical tactic. I gather, at least from his usage of the phrase, that he thought his critics either missed the point completely of what he was saying or took off on a tangent irrelevant to the drift of his concerns. That said, I still miss Fodor—and as you said in your review of , “Psycho-semantics”, in “The London Review of Books”, the man was chuck full of pure philosophical protein.
Yes, he was quite something.