Scientific Language Philosophy

Scientific Language Philosophy

We are familiar with Ordinary Language Philosophy, an Oxford product of the 1950s (perhaps partly derived from Wittgenstein in Cambridge). This approach has been criticized for its neglect of science, as if common sense is sufficient for a modern style of philosophy. But what about a different kind of linguistic turn—towards scientific language? We grant that ordinary language is an unsuitable focus of philosophical inquiry, but assert that the language of science provides the raw materials of philosophical reflection. We aren’t doing empirical science, to be sure, but we are scientifically informed: our focus is empirical scientific theory. We are a combination of Austin and Quine. Strangely, such a meta-philosophy has never been advocated, explicitly anyway. Yet it puts philosophy in close touch with science while still being recognizably philosophical. Such a philosophy could claim to be a priori and even to consist of analytic truths, but it takes its rise from the most modern of empirical theories. Scientific language has its place in the highest form of human knowledge (not in the metaphysics of the Stone Age, as Russell complained of ordinary language philosophy), so it provides the best possible basis for a scientifically informed philosophy. But it doesn’t collapse philosophy into a mere branch of empirical science, as a posteriori as science itself. Doesn’t this give us the best of both worlds? We lavish Austinian care on the language of science while taking Quinean delight in limiting ourselves to the scientific view of the universe. Now we know what to do with ourselves! Is philosophy, under this conception, “continuous with science”? Not if that means it is just more empirical science (it is still linguistically oriented and a priori); but it is certainly up to its neck in science, and hence shaped by the best empirical knowledge we have. We can still claim (if we like) that philosophy is concerned with “linguistic phenomenology” and that our focus is on the use of scientific language, but we cannot be charged with ignorance of science and slavish attachment to common sense.

            What form would this type of linguistic philosophy take? It need not be concerned with words as such: it can be directed towards meanings and concepts however these are to be understood. It can be concerned primarily with scientific sentences not individual scientific words (following Frege’s context principle). It can involve classical conceptual analysis (necessary and sufficient conditions etc.) or adopt a more relaxed view of conceptual elucidation (criteria of assertion or some such). It can emphasize the social aspects of scientific speech acts or it can remain resolutely individualistic. Presumably it will divide into subspecialties: some people will specialize in the language of physics, others the language of biology, others psychological language. We already have quite a bit of this going on, though without the overarching meta-philosophy I am outlining. Perhaps some concepts in science will be deemed bankrupt, or unhelpful, or obsolete. Perhaps there will be philosophical factions urging the superiority of some scientific words (and concepts) over others (no more talk of particles in physics just fields of force, for example). The linguistic philosopher need not be content to be merely descriptive; he or she can advocate for some linguistic usages over others. Philosophers and scientists can thus collaborate with each other. The result will be scientifically accurate and precisely formulated. Ordinary language can be left to its own dubious devices, according to this conception.

            For historical reasons, the linguistic turn is thought inseparable from ordinary language philosophy, but actually these are quite distinct ideas. In fact, the very distinction between ordinary language and scientific language is overblown and historically relative: words are often imported from common speech into scientific theories, and scientific words find their way into ordinary speech (“gravity”, “DNA”, “unconscious”). There is no principled opposition between the ordinary and the scientific (this is an “untenable dualism”), so there is nothing to impede the move towards a more science-oriented linguistic philosophy. I think a lot of good could come from systematic analysis of scientific terms, particularly in biology: verbal self-consciousness is always a useful antidote to confusion. Psychology was held back for a long time by uncritical use of the terms “stimulus” and “response”. So, let’s forge ahead with Scientific Language Philosophy (possibly supplemented by studies of the language of the humanities, as well as morals and politics). Botany would be a good place to start, given that botanists can’t even say what a plant is (it’s not an easy question).

Colin McGinn