Saying and Showing Wittgenstein famously introduced the distinction between saying and showing in the Tractatus. I won’t be concerned with his treatment of the distinction, either by way of interpretation or evaluation; but I will be using the terminology. I want to say that every speech act includes an act of showing, […]
Perception As Internalization We have become accustomed to thinking of perception as a type of causal relation, sharing its logical (metaphysical) features. As earthquakes cause buildings to collapse, so external objects cause experiences to occur. Cause and effect are external to each other; neither is contained in the other. But this picture fails […]
Ed Erwin Again It’s nice to receive two laudatory messages about Ed Erwin from Michael Tooley and Alan Goldman, both old colleagues of Ed’s at Miami (now posted under my brief notice of his death in May 2022). I observe, however, that neither the Brian Leiter blog nor Daily Nous has posted any notice […]
Concepts and Philosophical Puzzlement Michael Dummett has suggested that philosophical puzzlement is caused by our “imperfect mastery” of our concepts (he is by no means the only person to think this way).[1] He gives the example of the concepts past and future: we understand these concepts well enough to make judgments about […]
What is Mathematics About? Various suggestions have been made about this question: mathematics is about symbols, or mental constructions, or abstract Platonic entities. We can also ask what physics is about and expect a variety of answers: the sensations of the physicist, mind-independent material bodies, an all-pervading consciousness, abstract structure. In the […]
