Soiled, Torn, Dead

 

 

Soiled, Torn, Dead

 

Chapter 7, Part II, of Lolita is an extraordinarily powerful piece of writing, even by the standards of that work. This is the chapter that begins: “I am now faced with the distasteful task of recording a definite drop in Lolita’s morals”. In this chapter Humbert Humbert describes how the twelve-year-old Dolores Haze was turned into a prostitute by his demands on her. Her allowance was granted only on condition that she consents to his sexual requests. He reports: “Only very listlessly did she earn her three pennies—or three nickels—per day; and she proved to be a cruel negotiator whenever it was in her power to deny me certain life-wrecking, strange, slow paradisal philters without which I could not live more than a few days in a row, and which, because of the very nature of love’s languor, I could not obtain by force. Knowing the magic and might of her own soft mouth, she managed—during one schoolyear!—to raise the bonus price of a fancy embrace to three, or even four bucks.” Obviously we are here in the realm of utter depravity, once we look beyond Humbert’s lyrical evocations of his “nympholepsy”. The reader can only feel unqualified disgust with the perpetrator and pity for the victim. But he follows up this gut-wrenching report with the following jocular outburst: “O Reader! Laugh not, as you imagine me, on the very rack of joy noisily emitting dimes and quarters, and great big silver dollars like some sonorous, jingly and wholly demented machine vomiting riches; and in the margin of that leaping epilepsy she would firmly clutch a handful of coins in her little fist, which, anyway, I used to pry open afterwards unless she gave me the slip, scrambling away to hide her loot.” Here Nabokov juxtaposes a comical image of a jingly Humbert dispensing coins with a tragic state of affairs involving a prostituted young girl. It is a bold, not to say outrageous, juxtaposition: the tragic seen through the lens of the comedic. In this respect it starkly encapsulates the whole style and form of the novel. Just to drive the point home, Nabokov has Humbert remark casually: “I had brought prices down drastically by having her earn the hard and nauseous way permission to participate in the school’s theatrical program”. The chapter, which is mercifully short, ends with Humbert imagining the escaped Lolita in the “foul kitchen of a diner (Help Wanted) in a dismal ex-prairie state, with the wind blowing, and the stars blinking, and the cars, and bars, and the barmen, and everything soiled, torn, dead.”

            Here the very limits of cruelty and abuse are expressed through comical images and flippant phrases. It is as if the comedic and the tragic join and coalesce, with no gap between them. This enables the reader to feel the distance between Humbert’s self-serving narrative and the actual facts of the case: what he contrives to find funny is anything but. This I think is the key to the power of the chapter: there is a kind of double tragedy at work—the tragedy of Lolita’s life under Humbert’s rule, and the tragic lack of vision in Humbert’s skewed perception of reality. So blinded is he by his passions (if that is the word) that he finds comedy in tragedy, humor in despair. He laughs where he should cry. The reader cannot help but feel that such a tragic lack of vision is a powerful source of tragedy of the first kind. It is how evil allows itself to exist, at least in this instance. The chapter thus sets the stage for the later transformation of vision in Humbert, and is pivotal to the story. The very idea that Lolita has undergone a drop in morals is of course monstrous, and monstrously deluded on Humbert’s part, but it is entirely in keeping with the psychopathic turn of his mind. The reader can feel nothing but hatred and contempt for him at this point, with no possibility of redemption (despite later developments). The chapter works so powerfully on the reader precisely because it so poignantly captures Humbert’s madly distorted vision. And the image of the jingly, shuddering coin emitter is genuinely funny in its way, despite its horrific real-world correlate.  Nabokov knew exactly what he was doing here.  [1]

 

  [1] I once went to an all day reading of Lolita in New York City given by assorted scholars and celebrities. If I had been asked to participate, I would have chosen this chapter to read aloud. It is Nabokov’s art at its most sublime. The chapter links directly to chapter 20 in which Lolita’s tennis game is lovingly described and reality finally makes its white way into Humbert’s dark fevered consciousness.

Share

Metaphysical Pluralism

 

 

Metaphysical Pluralism

 

I will discuss a question at the outer edge of human comprehension. Some metaphysical views are monist, some dualist, and some pluralist. Monist views include materialism and idealism; dualist views typically divide reality into the mental and the material; and pluralist views include a variety of disparate types of being. A standard form of pluralism would list matter, space, time, mind, value, and number—with possible subdivisions within these broad categories. The question I want to discuss concerns pluralism of this type—the view that reality divides into several distinct categories and is not unified by any overarching category (or pair of categories). Thus matter is not the same as space, time is a distinct dimension of reality, mind is separate from matter, value is not reducible to any of the aforementioned, and mathematics deals with its own sphere of existence. We might further allow that matter and mind allow for subdivisions and are not themselves homogeneous categories. The picture is that reality comes intrinsically divided up into several types of being with no unifying ontological structure. The components may be connected in various ways, causally and otherwise, but there is no unity at a basic level: reality is fundamentally a list.  [1] Alternatively, reality is disjunctively defined: to be real is to be either matter or space or time or mind or value or mathematics. Reality is a mixed bag, a jumble, a heterogeneous collection. Hopes of unification are therefore misplaced.

            This seems unsatisfying. Why should reality be thus divided? Why should the universe be so lacking in unity? It seems thrown together, a mere assemblage, with neither rhyme nor reason. Why would God construct a universe so irreducibly diverse? Why would the laws of nature allow for such a miscellany? Monism allows for unification, and dualism at least keeps the ontological number low, but pluralism accepts arbitrary amounts of variety, gleefully so. Pluralism accepts that the inventory of what there is could go on indefinitely as a matter of principle. It all seems so chaotic and contingent—as if the universe is just a disorganized pile. The universe is really a multiverse: we might as well speak of there being as many universes as there are components of the single one. Compare games like chess or tennis: if we just listed their component parts—white and black pieces of different shapes, a board, squares; racquets, balls, a net, a court—we would be faced with a mere random assembly. It is only when we place these items in the context of a unified game that a sense of the whole emerges. Then the pluralistic universe is like the components without the game: these elements are not part of anything with a unifying theme. But why a pluralistic universe and not a unitary universe? Could there be some unknown unifying reality behind the apparent diversity? The nearest we come to unity is via mathematics: matter, space, and time all submit to mathematical description, and perhaps the mind admits of some mathematical characterization too. But value seems not to be mathematically subsumable, and the mind is not wholly mathematical. Perhaps it would be different if God were behind everything; at least then we might discern a unifying purpose to the apparently fragmentary nature of the universe. But an atheistic perspective leaves reality in a state of radical disunity: the universe just happens to jam together quite disparate elements, like an overstuffed suitcase. That is, metaphysical pluralism presents us with an unintelligible jumble of heterogeneous parts. The parts are notoriously hard to connect together (e.g. the mind-body problem and the problem of mathematical knowledge), but there is the more basic worry that they exist at all in such variety. It offends a natural desire for simplicity, or at least orderliness. If God were designing a universe, why would he impose such chaotic diversity on it? Why the desire for the new and different? Or again: if there are other universes existing alongside this one, do they all display such disunity? Surely there are non-pluralistic possible worlds, so why is the actual world condemned to unexplained plurality? It may well be that pluralist metaphysics is logically inescapable for the actual world, but that still leaves the question of why pluralism should be true to begin with. Why must we have the material and the spatial and the temporal and the mental and the normative and the mathematical? The urge towards monism becomes understandable once we appreciate that pluralism is not intellectually satisfying as a final metaphysical stance. For it leaves us with an impression of jangling meaninglessness, obdurate incoherence, and queasy randomness—the world should not be so sundered and splintered! It is as if the universe lives several different independent lives. If universal panpsychism were true, we would have the result that the universe is made up of several completely different types of mind, each alien to the other (the material mind, the spatial mind, the temporal mind, etc.). Reality, under metaphysical pluralism, is composed of far too many realities, if I may put it so. And this is not a point about the types of reality making up Reality, but about the sheer number of them. What if pluralism said that reality as a whole is made up of 283 basic types of reality? Why is 6 the magic number?

            Compare biological and astronomical reality. The biological world contains many types of animal—zoological pluralism is the norm—but this variety is underlain by a unifying theory, viz. the theory of evolution. So there is a fundamental unity to the variety we observe: the plurality isn’t just brute and inexplicable. Similarly, astronomy has discovered a plurality of galaxies where once we suppose unity, but this plurality is explained by the origin of the universe in the big bang (combined with the laws of nature)—it isn’t just a brute fact. But the plurality of the universe, as conceived by metaphysical pluralism, does seem like a brute fact (and is so intended by the metaphysical outlook in question). It seems distinctly arbitrary, surplus to requirements, and suspiciously de trop. It is not a plurality we can comfortably live with; it makes the universe seem casually put together, a mere congeries of qualitatively diverse elements. If we suppose (plausibly) that time is the original reality preceding all others, then the question time would have is why someone saw fit to keep introducing new realities in addition to time itself. It would be different if the additions were just modifications of time, but evidently they are completely different orders of being. Pleasing unity gave way to pointless disunity, gratuitous division. The universe became a mere bunch of sui generis elements. Metaphysical pluralism seems a bit too much like metaphysical anarchism. It may be true but it is hardly aesthetically pleasing or theoretically satisfying. Where was Occam’s razor when the universe needed it? Why the ontological multiplication for multiplication’s sake? And it is not as if the pieces fit snugly together, like pieces in a jigsaw; the pluralistic universe is by no means a harmonious universe. The architect of the universe was just making trouble for himself by insisting on irreducible plurality. The plural universe is a puzzling universe. Why Many instead of One?  [2]

 

  [1] I don’t of course mean that reality consists of words; the point is that reality is thought to be specified by a list of disparate elements each with its own nature.  

  [2] The question I am asking is not one I have seen addressed before, so it may seem odd or eccentric. I have tried to home in on the intuition in question, but it isn’t easy to do that. It might help if I say that the many types of reality envisaged by the pluralist look like so many types of stuff—and then the question is why so many types of stuff.

Share

A Paradox of Democracy

A Paradox of Democracy

 

A democratic state could decide democratically to abolish democracy. The people have come to the conclusion the democracy is dysfunctional, tyrannical (of the majority), and inefficient, so they vote to replace it with something better. According to democracy, they have a right to do that, and indeed a duty. Not to abolish democracy in the face of majority opinion, deferring to the opinion of a pro-democracy minority, goes against the entire meaning of democracy. They might even vote to abolish it forever, outlawing it in their new Constitution. Thus the correctness of democracy could undermine democracy. Not that the decision would be necessarily morally correct, but it would be what democratic principles dictate. If we interpreted democracy as constitutive of the right, then we would have the stronger paradox that according to democracy it would be right to reject democracy as a bad form of government. In fact, of course, majority opinion can never be constitutive of the right, just as God’s opinion cannot, but even granted that it could still be politically acceptable to abolish democracy according to democracy. This is a recipe for the instability of democracy.  

 

Share

Potentiality

 

Potentiality

 

Potentiality is not the same as possibility. Potentiality is a kind of power or capacity; possibility is a way things could be. Someone might have the potential to become a concert pianist but this might not actually be a possibility because of circumstances (no pianos to practice on, no teachers, etc.). And someone might possibly be a concert pianist but not have the potential to be one because of a lack of innate talent combined with suitable brain surgery. So nothing in the theory of possibility gives us automatic insight into potentiality (it isn’t simply a matter of what holds in various possible worlds). Nor is potentiality the same as the having of dispositions: to be potentially X is not to be disposed to be X (someone might be disposed to become an alcoholic rather than the concert pianist they have to potential to become). The potential is not the possible or dispositional but a sui generis type of fact. And it is a puzzling type of fact: somehow the future is “contained in” the present (or past)—implicit, foretold, prefigured. It is both there and not there—present only potentially. The acorn is potentially an oak tree (not a birch or a deer)—that is what it has the capacity to be. It is as if the acorn dreams of being an oak tree but not of other destinies. The case is like meaning and use: the use is “contained in” the meaning, but it is not as if the meaning consists of all the uses—it isn’t that the meaning is a compacted sequence of implicit uses (whatever that may mean).  [1] Brave acts are prefigured in the brave man and not the coward, but he may have done nothing brave in his entire life if the occasion has not arisen. The potentiality is a ghostly presence, bathed in philosophical obscurity. Yet the world is full of potentiality, especially the biological world: it is populated with these shadowy enigmatic facts. They are “queer”, inhospitable to empiricism, and not reducible to anything else. Maybe everything harbors a potentiality of some sort. Maybe properties are essentially potentialities.  [2]

 

Colin McGinn

 

 

  [1] Wittgenstein had a strong interest in the concept of the potential: his discussion of meaning in the Investigations is steeped in the idea (see in particular his remarks on machines in sections 193 and 194).

  [2] This kind of potentiality metaphysics implies that the present is always “bound up” with the future, so that every present fact “makes reference” to future facts (apologies for the scare quotes). Reality thus becomes temporally distributed in some hard-to-grasp way. 

 

Share